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Winston Churchill famously described democracy as the worst
form of government—but for all of the others. The same holds true of
judicial elections. Their merits are often overlooked when alternatives
are discussed. Indeed, the truth is that the alternatives have problems of
their own and do not produce better results.
In this essay, I will defend the use of partisan elections as a method
of selecting state court judges. I will first briefly describe the debate and
its participants. Then, I will discuss the competing values that
supporters and opponents of judicial elections advance. I will next
address the arguments for and against judicial elections, showing that,
while they may not be a perfect method of selecting judges, neither are
the alternatives.
At the outset, though, I will briefly describe the ways in which the
states currently select their judges. In 1988, Harry Stumpf noted that the
variety of selection methods constituted a “rather unclear patchwork” of
selection systems. 1 The primary difference has been, and is, between
*
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redistricting, voting rights, and other election law issues. Park has formerly served as an Army JAG
Officer, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Special Assistant to the Inspector
General for The Corporation for National and Community Service, and a Visiting Legal Fellow at
The Heritage Foundation.
1. HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 160 (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich
1988); see also id., at 164 (a “hodgepodge” of selection mechanisms”). Complicating matters, in
Michigan and Ohio, the political parties nominate candidates for judicial office, but the election is
conducted on a nonpartisan basis. See Matthew J. Streb, “The Study of Judicial Elections,” in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 7 (Streb ed., 2007) [hereinafter RUNNING FOR JUDGE].
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elective systems (both partisan and nonpartisan) and appointive systems.
The so-called Missouri plan is emblematic of the majority of the
appointive plans. It calls for a commission to nominate three candidates,
one of whom is then selected by the Governor. All of the judges so
appointed stand for a retention election that allows voters to choose
whether to retain them or not, but does not pit them against another
named candidate. For the purposes of this essay, the primary selection
methods will be partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and merit, or
Missouri plan, selection by a commission.
I. THE DEBATE
While complaints about judicial elections have been made for some
time, the nature of those complaints has changed. Years ago, judicial
elections were criticized because they were sleepy contests in which
challengers did not appear, voters did not participate, and incumbents
did not lose. Now, the opponents complain that the opposite is the case;
challengers appear, incumbents sometimes lose, elections are noisy and
expensive, and the judiciary is demeaned as a result.
Judicial elections have powerful opponents. They include retired
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, John Grisham, the
organized bar, mainstream media, George Soros and his Open Society
Institute, and law professors. They believe that issue-oriented political
campaigns, with all of their promises, advertising, and fund raising, lead
voters to think of judges as politicians, instead of appreciating them as
disinterested guardians of the law.2 Their proposed solution is the
replacement of partisan elections with, at the least, non-partisan
elections and, even better, what many call merit selection plans.
The supporters of judicial elections are less well-known. Two of
those supporters describe them as “[m]ostly a small handful of social
scientists” who “rely primarily on arguments about the value of
accountability and . . . recognize the inherently political nature of
judicial decision making.” 3 For my part, I support partisan judicial
elections because I saw how they helped to change the business climate

2. Cf. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (Harvard Univ. Press 1958) (“For
myself, it would be irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to
choose them, which I assuredly do not.”).
3. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2
(2009).
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of Alabama for the better between 1994 and the present.4 And the court
did so by applying well-settled law to the cases before it without
improperly favoring business interests. 5
In addition to races for the Senate, U. S. House of Representatives,
governorships and state legislative positions, the 2010 elections included
elections for appellate judges in a number of states that gave supporters
and opponents of judicial elections the opportunity to make their
arguments. The Justice at Stake Campaign, an opponent of judicial
elections, published The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009:
Decade of Change in which it pointed to a “pronounced and systemic”
surge in spending on judicial elections campaigns, particularly by “super
spenders.” 6 In response, the American Justice Partnership published
Justice Hijacked: Your Right to Vote is at Stake, in which Colleen Pero
noted, among other things, the amount of money that George Soros and
his Open Society Institute has contributed to groups opposing the
election of judges, including the three organizations that published The
New Politics. 7 Members of the Federalist Society also published white
papers on the Alabama, Texas, North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois,
California, and Washington supreme courts. 8
Results in the elections varied. Three justices on the Iowa Supreme
Court who had joined in an opinion striking down an Iowa law that
limited civil marriage to a union between a man and a woman, were not
retained. 9 A justice on the Illinois Supreme Court who joined in striking
down tort reform legislation as unconstitutional under the state

4. See, e.g., Michael DeBow, The Road Back from “Tort Hell”: The Alabama Supreme
Court, 1994-2004 (2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-road-backfrom-tort-hell-the-alabama-supreme-court-1994-2004.
5. See Jack Park, Alabama Supreme Court: Role of Court in Key Corporate Cases, (2010)
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications.
6. Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009: Decade of Change, at 1,
available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources.
7. Colleen Pero, Justice Hijacked: Your Right to Vote is at Stake, (2010), available at
http://www.americanjusticepartnership.com/hijacked.php. From a review of the Form 990’s that
certain federally tax-exempt organizations file with the IRS, the report calculated that, between
2000 and 2008, the Open Society Institute contributed more than $2.8 million to Justice at Stake,
$2.225 million to the Brennan Center for Justice, and nearly $1 million to the National Institute for
Money in State Politics. Id. at 11.
8. See generally, FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications (last visited
April 10, 2011). The views stated in those white papers are those of the authors, not of the
Federalist Society.
9. See, e.g., Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 3,
2010,
available
at
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-threejustices.
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constitution was retained. 10 Voters in Nevada rejected a proposal to
adopt a merit selection plan to replace their current system of
nonpartisan elections.11 That Nevada initiative included recorded calls
with a message from Justice O’Connor, which she said was not
authorized, urging voters to vote for the proposed change to merit
selection. 12
II. THE COMPETING VALUES
Supporters and opponents of judicial elections advance different
values to support their positions. Supporters invoke accountability,
while opponents rely on independence. The parties tend to talk past
each other, so it is not only important to understand the competing
values and their limitations, but also to try to move beyond them by
considering the evidence that supports the arguments made by each side.
The authors of a 2000 Federalist Society white paper supporting
judicial elections explain that too much of either accountability or
independence is “unattractive.” 13 Judges who are too independent may
do whatever they want, and those who are too accountable may follow
public opinion polls or political party preferences in their decisions. The
authors observe, “Ideally, we want a system that selects judges who
combine the virtues of independence and accountability in just the right
amounts, but perfection is an unlikely result of our choice of judicial
selection mechanism.” 14
Accountability means answering for one’s actions or inactions.
Some suggest that, instead of answering to voters, judges should answer
to the law, but the law is not self-enforcing. An appellate court can
require a lower court to follow the law, but the Supreme Court and, to a
lesser extent, the supreme courts of the states have the final word on
constitutional issues. Accordingly, reliance on judges to police their

10. See, e.g., Ann Knef, “Justice Kilbride Prevails in Costly Ill. Retention Election,”
LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/229640-justice-kilbrideprevails-in-costly-ill.-retention-election.
11. See, e.g., “Nevada Voters Reject Judicial Ballot Measures,” LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 3,
2010, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/nov/03/nv-nevada-measures-2nd-ldwritethru/.
12. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, “‘Robo-Calls’ Spark Debate Over Justice O’Connor’s Support for
Oct.
28,
2010,
Ballot
Initiative,”
LAW.COM,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202474019348&rss=newswire&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
13. Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, at 2, (2003) available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications.
14. Id.
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own fidelity to the law does not provide much in the way of
accountability.
Elections are “powerful legitimacy-creating institutions” that
“create an inextricable link” between the voters and those they elect.15
Creating that link between judges and the state’s voters is important. A
finding that Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner make supports
the notion that judicial elections create a link between judges and the
voters. They conclude that appellate judges selected through partisan
judicial elections write more opinions than the judges who are appointed
to their position, but the appointed judges write opinions that are cited
more often. 16 From this, they go on to write that, while elected judges
“care about their reputation in the local community of lay voters and
politicians,” appointed judges are above that and “care about their
reputation among a national community of like-minded professionals.” 17
Put differently, elected judges know for whom they work and who pays
their salary. That knowledge can restrain the kind of judicial activism
discussed below.
As Judge William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
notes, judicial independence was originally understood to mean
independence from the other branches of government. 18 The Framers
“widely agreed” that the judiciary should be independent of the
executive and legislative branches and provided for that independence in
Article III of the Constitution. 19 Judge Pryor also explains that the
Framers “expected the judiciary to be accountable to the people.” 20
Independence was also understood to mean “decisional
independence,” which is a judge’s ability to “decide a case fairly based
on the facts and the law.” 21 The Framers protected this lofty role of the
federal judges by giving them life tenure and by precluding cuts in their
pay in the Constitution.22

15. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3 at 17.
16. Stephen Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION
290, 309, 315 (2010) [hereinafter Professionals or Politicians].
17. Id. at 292.
18. William H. Pryor, Jr., Not-So-Serious Threats to Judicial Independence, 93 VA. L. REV.
1759, 1764 (2007).
19. Id. Judge Pryor points to the provisions of § 1 of Article III, which vest the entirety of the
judicial power in the judiciary, provide tenure for federal judges, and guarantee their compensation.
Id.
20. Id. at 1765.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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In the hands of the opponents of judicial elections, though,
independence is often invoked to support immunity from public
pressure, the ability to make unpopular decisions without fearing
negative political consequences. Pitched this way, independence makes
a virtue out of a court’s rejecting the views of the legislature or the
perceived majority view of the community.
Law school classes in constitutional law discuss the “countermajoritarian difficulty.” Rather than being a badge of honor, the
judiciary’s thwarting of the will of the legislature is a fundamental point
of tension. Alexander Bickel explained:
[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned
in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it
be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions,
born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the
system. Judicial review works counter to this characteristic. 23

The more frequently courts indulge their power to trump the
legislative process, the greater the tension. As with steam, the greater
the tension, the greater will be the need for an outlet, which elections can
provide.
Elections may be “blunt instruments of accountability,” but they are
also “effective in maintaining popular control over the outer limits of
governmental decision-making.” 24 When courts find the right to samesex marriage, recover unlimited amounts of noneconomic damages, or to
more funding for some school systems, as they have done, those courts
push the outer limits of governmental decision-making. Voters do not
act inappropriately in voting against appellate judges who act like
legislators.
III. THE ARGUMENTS
A.

The Political Cannot Be Depoliticized

Those who oppose an elected judiciary contend that the alternative
merit selection method is less political than elections. There are two
problems with this objection. First, judicial selection is a political

23. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 19 (1962).
24. STUMPF, supra note 1 (quoting PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 238-39 (1980)); see also BONNEAU & HALL,
supra note 3, at 14 (“Justices who are elected . . . have a strong incentive to consider constituency
preferences on those few issues that are publicly salient and politically visible.”).
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process, no matter how it is done. Second, when state appellate courts
behave like legislators, try to solve social problems, or flout the will of
the majority, they do political work. And, when they do political work,
it is appropriate to hold them politically accountable.
1. Judicial Selection is a Political Process
Federal judicial selection is tantamount to anointment, but politics
plays a major role. Candidates for a federal judicial position resemble
nothing so much as a group of people running around in a thunderstorm
each holding up an umbrella hoping that he or she will be the one struck
by lightning. Those candidates must be of the right political party and
obtain the approval of State Senators to be nominated. The nominees
must also appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee to defend their
qualifications, and, if they are lucky, their nomination is debated on the
floor of the Senate. Nominations like those of Robert Bork and Justice
Clarence Thomas, among others, evidence that the federal process
involves a big dose of politics.
Political considerations do not disappear when merit selection plans
are used; those considerations just move behind the closed door of the
selection process.
There, the members of the merit selection
commissions have to curry favor with the various factions of the bar. 25
For example, lawyers control 16 of the 17 seats on the commission that
is responsible for selecting appellate judges in Maryland and 15 of the
17 seats on Tennessee’s Judicial Nominating Commission, even though
that state legislature cut the number of lawyer seats to 10 in 2009.26
Elsewhere, lawyers are generally well represented. Nobody should be
surprised if they tend to favor the candidates they deem most likely to
“protect[] and expand[] the domain of law and lawyers and thus raise[]
lawyers’ incomes and influence.” 27
Moreover, the appointment process is not free from the influence of
politics. When Republican Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey
decided not to re-appoint Justice John Wallace to the New Jersey

25. See Bryan T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675 (2009);
Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751 (2009).
26. Pero, supra note 7, at 13.
27. Michael DeBow, The Bench, The Bar, and Everyone Else: Some Questions About State
Judicial Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 777, 779. See also id. at 779 n.10 (quoting F. Andrew Hanssen,
On the Politics of Judicial Selection: Lawyers and State Campaigns for the Merit Plan, 110 PUB.
CHOICE 79, 80 (2002)) (“One economic study of lawyer support for merit selection found that ‘the
merit plan is associated with between eighteen and thirty-two percent more filings in state supreme
courts over the period 1985 through 1994.’”).
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Supreme Court, he said that his action was not a reflection on Wallace,
but, rather, on the court, which had a “history of using legal precedent to
set social and tax policies—a role which belongs squarely with the
Legislative and Executive branches of state government.”28 Governor
Christie nominated Anne Patterson instead, but the Democratic President
of the New Jersey Senate declined to hold hearings on the nomination. 29
In Missouri, after Missouri Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White
retired, Governor Matt Blunt, who campaigned against a runaway
judiciary, criticized the judicial nominating commission process and the
candidates they submitted. Instead of respecting the fact that Governor
Blunt had been elected with a majority of the votes, the panel sent him
“three well-credentialed, business-as-usual, ‘there is no problem with the
Supreme Court of Missouri’ candidates.” 30 Some suggested that
Governor Blunt reject all three candidates, but, under the Missouri
procedure, that would have left the decision to the commission. 31
Governor Blunt held his nose and appointed one of the candidates.32
Finally, with respect to the “officially nonpartisan” judicial election
for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2008, “progressives” and
the teachers union supported Louis Butler, the incumbent who was
defeated, while business and law enforcement interests supported the
Something similar apparently
challenger, Michael Gableman. 33
happened in the race between David Prosser and JoAnne Kloppenburg. 34
The nonpartisan label, thus, has not blinded the interests or the voters.

28. See Press Release, Governor Chris Christie, Governor Chris Christie Announces
Appointment to the New Jersey Supreme Court (May 3, 2010).
29. See generally Kevin Mooney, Supreme Confidence, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Feb. 15,
2011), available at http://www.spectator.org.
30. Clifford W. Taylor, Without Merit: Why “Merit” Selection Is the Wrong Way for States
to Choose Judges, at 4 (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.heritage.org.
31. Id.
32. See id. As Taylor noted, Governor Blount was “the only person in the process who had
any claim to having presented his ideas on who should serve as justices to the people of Missouri
. . . was blocked in a transparently political move that compelled his selection of the least
disagreeable candidate. Id.
33. See, e.g., Patrick Marley & Stacy Foster, Gableman victorious: Challenger Beats Butler
in High Court Race; 1st Such Ouster Since ’67, WISCONSIN JOURNAL-SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2008),
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/29406414.html.
President Obama has
nominated Butler for a federal district court judgeship. See Jack Park, Look Out for “Loophole
Louie”, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=34653.
34. See, e.g., Robert Costa, Dem Rep: Prosser Equals Walker, Prosser Equals Koch,
NATIONAL REVIEW, Apr. 3, 2011, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/263750/demrep-prosser-equals-walker-prosser-equals-koch-robert-costa.
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2. The Decisions of State Supreme Courts Have Political
Consequences
Is it wrong to seek to hold judges accountable? Some of those
opposed to judicial elections reason that judges are not like legislators
because they do not make political decisions. That argument fails
because judges make decisions that have important political and public
policy consequences.
State courts have interpreted their state
constitutions to mandate the recognition of same-sex marriage. 35 Other
judicial rulings have overturned legislative tort reform measures such as
laws capping the recovery of noneconomic damages on the ground that
they violated state constitutions. 36
Rulings like these raise important questions regarding the proper
role of the judiciary and judicial philosophy. Lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of state systems of financing public education, for
example, constitute “a quintessential example of judicial activism—the
least accountable branch of state government overrules the highly visible
public policies set by state and local legislative bodies, and uses
relatively novel legal precedent.” 37 The ruling in New Jersey that
mandated a new system of financing public education, for example, was
based on a provision calling for a “thorough and efficient” system of
public education. 38 Such rulings produce judicial second-guessing of the
legislature’s efforts to comply with the court’s ruling; what the
legislature provides rarely satisfies the prevailing plaintiffs. 39 The result
is unsightly fights between the legislature, which has the responsibility

35. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of
Public Health, 957 A. 2d 407 (Conn. 2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Michael DeBow observes,
“Litigation over same-sex marriage, typically centered on the equal protection provisions of state
constitutions, is probably the most visible example of this phenomenon [i.e., the “countermajoritarian difficulty”] at the present time.” DeBow, supra note 27, at 780 n.12.
36. See, e.g., American Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010)
(statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violates State constitution’s
right to trial by jury); Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); Best v.
Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (statutory cap on noneconomic damages
violates state constitutional bar on special legislation and separation of powers provision); Wright v.
Central DuPage Hospital Assn., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
37. Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Courts Activist
and Others Are Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (2000).
38. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, §4.
39. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006)
(rejecting contention of New York City that additional $1.93 billion in funding is insufficient; New
York City sought an additional $5.53 billion).
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to allocate funding to all state functions, and the judiciary, which has
mandated additional funding for public education.
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health 40 isolates an important question of
judicial philosophy. In holding that a Connecticut civil union law that
defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, the court gave voice to
the living constitution rationale. The court wrote that the state’s
constitution “was meant to be, and is, a living document with current
effectiveness . . . [i]t is an instrument of progress . . . and should not be
interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have
contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens.” 41 As for marriage,
the court stated that “our conventional understanding of marriage must
yield to a more contemporary appreciation of the rights entitled to
constitutional protection.” 42
If the drafters of the Connecticut Constitution had same-sex
marriage in mind when they did their work, the court would not have
had to invoke the “living constitution” in all its glory. The court had to
find that right somewhere other than in the law. The court also had to
bypass the amendment process in the state constitution, taking on itself
the burden of making the state “yield to a more contemporary
appreciation of the rights entitled to constitutional protection.” 43 As
Robert Bork has warned, when a court “decides it is the instrument of
the general will and keeper of the [public] conscience,” there is no
longer any law, just “the moral imperatives and self-righteousness of the
hour.” 44
The Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling in Varnum v. Brien, holding
that a state statute limiting civil marriage to a union between a man and a
woman violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution,
raised similarly important questions of judicial philosophy. 45 As with
the Connecticut Constitution, the drafters of the 1858 Iowa Constitution
did not have same-sex marriage in mind when they drafted that clause.
The voters of Iowa had a remedy, however, in retention elections, and
they used it to remove the three justices who were up for retention.46
40. 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
41. Id. at 420-21 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 482.
43. Id.
44. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
132 (1990).
45. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
46. See Schulte, supra note 9.
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Separate and apart from decisions with important political
consequences, the state courts have an effect on the state’s business
climate. The Alabama Supreme Court of the late 1980’s and early
1990’s was identified in the minds of many with a litigation climate that
was hostile to corporate defendants. One example is the court’s decision
in BMW of North America v. Gore, 47 in which the court ordered BMW
to pay punitive damages of $2 million because the company touched up
the paint job on the vehicle it sold without disclosing the repair, a
punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 500-1. In another decision,
the court struck down a statutory cap on punitive damages on the ground
that the cap violated the state constitution’s guarantee of a right to a jury
trial. 48 The court also adopted a plaintiff-friendly “justifiable reliance”
standard for fraud actions and applied it to both consumer and
commercial transactions. 49 The combination of the relaxed standard for
proving reliance in fraud cases and the absence of a cap on punitive
damages contributed to the state’s reputation as a “tort hell.”
Elections helped to change that court, and Alabama has reaped the
benefit of that change. The declaration by Republican candidates that
they saw that the role of the judiciary is to say what the law is, not what
it ought to be, resonated with the voters. In subsequent elections,
Democratic candidates made the same declaration, but the Republican
incumbents have proven trustworthy. Since the change in the court’s
personnel, multinational businesses like Mercedes, Honda, Hyundai, and
Thyssen-Krupp have built plants in the state, providing employment
opportunities to many residents.

47. 646 So.2d 619 (Ala. 1994), rev’d 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
48. Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878 (Ala. 1993).
49. Johnson v. State Farm Ins. Co., 587 So.2d 974, 979 (Ala. 1991). In 1997, the court
observed that the adoption of the justifiable reliance standard had been a mistake and returned to the
reasonable reliance standard that had previously been in use. See Foremost Ins. v. Parham, 693
So.2d 409 (Ala. 1997). Significantly, Justice Shores agreed with the decision to return to the
reasonable reliance standard. She wrote, “In my opinion, this Court made a mistake in departing
from a standard in fraud cases that had worked well. As a member of the majority that made that
departure, I am willing to admit that the rule should not have been changed.” Id. at 437 (Shores, J.,
concurring specially).
The difference between the two standards can be seen in a common scenario from that
time period. The purchaser of a mobile home claims that he was defrauded by the seller’s agent
who told him something that was inconsistent with the plain terms of the written contract the
plaintiff signed. Under the justifiable reliance standard, the buyer might claim that he relied on
what he was told and might reach the jury on that claim. Under the reasonable reliance standard,
the plain terms of the contract would be more likely to control.
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The Practice of Judicial Elections

The opponents of judicial elections complain that elections
demean the judiciary because the need to raise campaign funds, the
related advertising, and the campaigning put the judiciary in a bad light.
Critics view voters as uninterested and question the qualifications of
candidates. In this portion of the essay, I will address those complaints.
1. Money
Any focus on spending in judicial election campaigns needs to be
put in perspective. A good place to start is here: “[M]oney is a
necessary but insufficient condition for electoral success,”50 and
electoral success is what candidates are after. In addition, by
comparison to other spending, spending on political campaigns is not
significant. As George Will noted last October, the anticipated total
spending by all parties, campaigns, and issue-advocacy groups on all
political offices in the two-year cycle between 2008 and 2010 was
expected to be $4.2 billion, less than what Procter & Gamble spent on
advertising in one year ($8.6 billion) and less than what Americans
spend on potato chips in a year ($7.1 billion).51 Appointive systems are
not free of spending. Approximately $3.7 million was spent to influence
the confirmations of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice
Samuel Alito for their Supreme Court positions. 52 Given those figures,
it is difficult to say that too much is spent on any one race.
In addition, judicial campaigns are typically down-ticket races.
They typically appear on the ballot below races for Congress, Governor,
and other statewide officials. Candidates must spend money in order to
generate name recognition and encourage voters to look beyond those
higher-profile races. Bonneau and Hall observe that candidates for state
supreme court positions cannot generate “free” publicity like candidates
for other offices can. 53 For example, many incumbent officials issue
press releases, and members of Congress have the benefit of the franking
privilege.

50. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 76.
51. George Will, Return of the Scold War, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2010, at A21. Will also
noted that the $4.2 billion expectation was about what Americans spend on yogurt in a year, but less
than what they spend on Halloween candy in two years. Id.
52. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 1, at 90.
53. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3 at 77.
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In this connection, it is important to note the role that political
parties play. Bonneau and Hall note that political parties are “powerful
organizational actor[s]” which have experience in raising funds and
running campaigns. 54 Voters can also rely on the party’s imprimatur.
Baum and Klein suggest that, when voters rely on the party’s
imprimatur, they may not be basing their voting decision on information
about the candidate’s performance, with the result that accountability is
blurred. 55 That suggestion is problematic given that there is good reason
to believe that Democrat lawyers think differently from Republican
lawyers. Moreover, the candidate who has won a primary election has
not only earned the right to the imprimatur, but also has been vetted to a
degree by the party and the voters.
The Justice at Stake Campaign sounds the alarm about the
amount of spending in judicial campaigns and the fact that much of it is
done by “super spenders.” 56 Bonneau and Hall make some findings that
put the alarm in its place. From their review of elections between 1990
and 2004, they conclude that nonpartisan elections “significantly raise
the costs of seeking office,” and that incumbents tend to outspend
challengers. 57 The alarm also fails to reflect some of the reasons for
spending. Justice at Stake points at the 2008 Alabama race between
Greg Shaw, a judge of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and
Deborah Bell Paseur, a state court trial judge. However, that race
involved an open seat on the Alabama Supreme Court, which was the
only seat up for election in 2008. 58 By failing to consider the context for
spending, Justice at Stake overstates its case.
2. Voter Knowledge
The contention that voters lack interest in judicial elections and
knowledge sufficient to judge the qualifications of the candidates has
problems as well. At the outset, it smacks of elitism, in that voters are
deemed competent to vote for other elected officials, but not for judges.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Laurence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 1, at 142.
56. Sample et al., supra note 6.
57. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 49, 71.
58. See, e.g., Greg Shaw Narrowly Wins Alabama Supreme Court Post, THE BIRMINGHAM
NEWS
(Nov.
5,
2008,
9:21
AM),
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2008/11/greg_shaw_narrowly_wins_alabam.html.
See also Eric
Velasco, Spending Down in Alabama Supreme Court race, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011,
8:00 AM) http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/02/spending_down_in_alabama_supre.html (noting that
spending for those same seats in 2004 was $7.7 million, but only $4.3 million in 2010).
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As former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court Cliff Taylor
puts it, the notion that as “well-intentioned as [voters] are, they are just
unable to evaluate judges because judges’ work is very sophisticated and
common folks don’t have the learning to appreciate it” sounds
“plausible,” but it does not bear up when examined closely. 59
One way of measuring voter interest is by looking at the
phenomenon of roll-off in elections. Some voters vote only for the
offices they consider to be the most important and do not vote in the
other races on the ballot. For example, in presidential election years,
many voters vote only for a presidential candidate and ignore the other
races. As Bonneau and Hall put it, “Presidential elections encourage
‘casual’ voters to participate, and these people are not likely to vote for
‘insignificant’ races, such as state supreme court.” 60 When they looked
at ballot roll-off in state supreme court elections between 1990 and 2004,
Bonneau and Hall found that “higher amounts of campaign spending
produce significantly lower levels of roll-off.” 61 Baum and Klein found
the same thing when they looked at voter participation in the 1998 and
2002 elections in Ohio, both of which included state supreme court
positions on the ballot. 62
Bonneau and Hall also see voters and candidates as rational actors.
Candidates act rationally: “Challengers go after incumbents who are the
most electorally vulnerable, either because they hold marginal seats or
because they suffer an attenuated incumbency advantage by virtue of
never having been elected.” 63 Incumbents are electorally vulnerable
when they win by a small margin in their last election or when they are
appointed to fill a vacancy. The latter enjoy the benefit of incumbency
without having been elected and lack campaign experience. We should
not be surprised when candidates decide to challenge vulnerable
incumbents and spend money to educate voters.

59. Taylor, supra note 30, at 2.
60. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 44.
61. Id.
62. Baum & Klein, supra note 55, at 150 (“The enormous difference in the volume of
information from the campaigns and the news media had a very substantial effect on voters’
participation in the [2002] supreme court races.”).
63. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 96; see also id. (“[T]he likelihood of challengers
entering state supreme court elections is predictable and reflects, at least to some extent, strategic
thinking about the probability of winning.”).
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3. Quality of Candidates and Judges
The evidence does not support the contention that merit selection
mechanisms produce better judges. At least two studies show that
appellate judges tend to have comparable qualifications without regard
for the way in which they were selected. 64 Bonneau and Hall also
conclude that voters can distinguish among candidates by their
qualifications, favoring challengers with judicial experience over those
without it. 65 In other words, voters tend to like candidates whose first
name is “Judge.”
Other scholars have found that “[e]lected judges write more
opinions” 66 than appointed judges and that even though the opinions of
appointed judges are cited more frequently, “the evidence suggests that
the large quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference.67
This suggests that voters may view productivity as one measure of
judicial competence.68 Voters may also view productivity as a sign that
the judge is doing his or her job. In the 2010 elections in Alabama,
Associate Justice Tom Parker had to respond to suggestions that he was
significantly behind in his work. 69 Finally, as noted above, the
difference may reflect who the judge thinks he or she works for. Elected
judges think they work for the voters, while appointed, merit-selection
judges look for the respect of the larger legal community.
4. The Alternatives Revisited
Opponents of elections contend that merit selection plans and
retention elections are preferable to partisan elections for a variety of
64. See Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics:
The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, in JUDICATURE 228-35 (Dec.-Jan. 1987);
BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 136 (“[D]iversity on the bench is not affected by the particular
methods of for staffing the bench.”) (citing Mark S. Hurwitz and Drew Lanier Noble, Explaining
Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on Supreme
Courts and Appellate Courts, 3 STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY 329-352 (2003)).
65. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 101 (“[T]he electorate not only responds to basic
differences between challengers, but also appears to differentiate between types of judicial
experience” and “the electorate takes into account judicial experience when selecting among
candidates.”).
66. Choi et al., supra note 16, at 290.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 312.
69. See, e.g., Chris Anthony, Parsons: Tom Parker is the Least Productive Justice, OPELIKAAUBURN NEWS,
Available at http://bamafactcheck.com/view/full_story_opelika/9756080/article-Parsons--TomParker-is-the-least-productive-justice-on-the-Alabama-Supreme-Court-Truth-Rating--5-out-of-5?instance=special; see also Choi et al., supra note 16, at 312.
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reasons. Without conceding that the opponents are correct, the political
implications of merit selection should be closely examined.
Michael DeBow notes that ideology and the self-interest of lawyers
are good reasons to be concerned about the extent of lawyer influence on
the nominating commissions in non-election states.70 With respect to
ideology, Brian Fitzpatrick collected data on the appellate court
nominees in Tennessee and Missouri, both so-called merit selection
states. He determined that, in Tennessee, 67% of the nominees voted
more often in Democratic primaries and 33% voted more often in
Republican primaries. 71 As for Missouri, Fitzpatrick’s conclusions are
striking:
Of the fifty-four nominees in Missouri since 1995 who made any
campaign contributions, 87% gave more to Democrats than
Republicans, and only 13% gave more to Republicans than Democrats.
Over the same time period, Democratic candidates in Missouri only
received roughly 50% of the general election votes in state and federal
House races. . . . It should be noted that the disparity in the amount of
money these nominees contributed is even more stark than the
disparity in the number of nominees who contributed: nearly 93%
($316,010) of all of the money contributed went to Democratic
candidates, whereas only 7% ($24, 615) went to Republicans. 72

Those results correlate with the general belief that, as a group,
lawyers “are, on average, more liberal (in the contemporary political
sense—i.e., associated more closely with policy positions held by the
As for
Democratic Party) than are members of the general public.”73
their self-interest, DeBow observes that, as a group, lawyers “have an
obvious personal interest in the level of lawyer incomes, which in turn is
a function of the importance of law in American society.” 74 We should
not be surprised if the interests of lawyers are reflected in the
recommendations that lawyer members of nominating commissions
make. This is even more the case if, as Cliff Taylor points out, all of the
applicants will have good records. In that light,

70. DeBow, The Bench, the Bar, and Everyone Else, supra note 27, at 778.
71. Brian Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 675, 693 (reviewing
voting records for 88 of 90 nominees).
72. Id. at 696-97 (emphasis added) (finding 54 of 108 nominees to have made political
contributions).
73. Id. at 676.
74. DeBow, supra note 27, at 779.
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it quickly becomes clear that it is reckless to say that because one
applicant, many years ago, had a 3.5 GPA and another a 3.6 GPA at
different law schools, or that, later in life, one was a Boy Scout leader
and the other a food bank volunteer, one is “merit qualified” and the
other isn’t. 75

Merit selection will inevitably boil down to consideration of something
other than “merit.”
IV. CONCLUSION
At twenty year intervals, merit selection has been reviewed and
found wanting. In 1969, Richard Watson and Ronald Downing
published a comprehensive study of the origins and operation of the
Missouri Plan. They found that the lawyer members of the nominating
commissions tended to look at candidates in the light of their practices
and clients. The effect was to replace electoral politics with a
“somewhat subterranean process of bar and bench politics, in which
there is little popular control.”76 Some twenty years later, Harry Stumpf
wrote, “If the lay, the professional, and even the political inputs built
into the Missouri Plan do not work as advertised, and if the plan in
general cannot be shown to produce superior judges, what is left of the
argument? The answer is, not much.” 77 In 2007, Bonneau and Hall
reviewed the results of state court judicial elections from 1990-2004 and
considered the objections to judicial elections in the light of that review.
Once again, Bonneau and Hall found that merit selection did not prove
better in practice than judicial elections.
No system of judicial selection is perfect, but elections provide a
means of holding judges accountable when they push the outer limits of
governmental decision-making. We can use lawyers to select our
judges, or we can let the voters do it. For me, I’ll take the voters.78

75. Taylor, supra note 30 at 3.
76. See id. at 3-4; see also STUMPF, supra note 1, at 167.
77. STUMPF, supra note 1, at 171.
78. Cf. Matthew J. Streb & Brian Frederick, Judicial Reform and the Future of Judicial
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 1, at 205-06 (noting “deep voter suspicion” of
attempts to have them surrender their right to vote for judges).

